EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7SSL) OpenSSL EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7SSL)
NAME
EVP_KDF-PBKDF2 - The PBKDF2 EVP_KDF implementation
DESCRIPTION
Support for computing the PBKDF2 password-based KDF through the EVP_KDF
API.
The EVP_KDF-PBKDF2 algorithm implements the PBKDF2 password-based key
derivation function, as described in SP800-132; it derives a key from a
password using a salt and iteration count.
The output is considered to be a cryptographic key.
Identity
"PBKDF2" is the name for this implementation; it can be used with the
EVP_KDF_fetch() function.
Supported parameters
The supported parameters are:
"pass" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD) <octet string>
"salt" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT) <octet string>
"iter" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER) <unsigned integer>
This parameter has a default value of 2048.
"properties" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES) <UTF8 string>
"digest" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST) <UTF8 string>
These parameters work as described in "PARAMETERS" in EVP_KDF(3).
"pkcs5" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5) <integer>
This parameter can be used to enable or disable SP800-132 compliance
checks. Setting the mode to 0 enables the compliance checks.
The checks performed are:
- the iteration count is at least 1000.
- the salt length is at least 128 bits.
- the derived key length is at least 112 bits.
The default provider uses a default mode of 1 for backwards
compatibility, and the FIPS provider uses a default mode of 0. This
option breaks FIPS compliance if it causes the approved "fips-
indicator" to return 0.
"fips-indicator" (OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_APPROVED_INDICATOR) <integer>
This option is used by the OpenSSL FIPS provider.
A getter that returns 1 if the operation is FIPS approved, or 0
otherwise. This may be used after calling EVP_KDF_derive. It
returns 0 if "pkcs5" is set to 1 and the derived key length, salt
length or iteration count test fails.
NOTES
A typical application of this algorithm is to derive keying material for
an encryption algorithm from a password in the "pass", a salt in "salt",
and an iteration count.
Increasing the "iter" parameter slows down the algorithm which makes it
harder for an attacker to perform a brute force attack using a large
number of candidate passwords.
No assumption is made regarding the given password; it is simply treated
as a byte sequence.
CONFORMING TO
SP800-132
SEE ALSO
EVP_KDF(3), EVP_KDF_CTX_new(3), EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3),
EVP_KDF_CTX_set_params(3), EVP_KDF_derive(3), "PARAMETERS" in EVP_KDF(3)
HISTORY
This functionality was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2018-2024 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
3.5.4 2025-09-30 EVP_KDF-PBKDF2(7SSL)
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